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LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR RWANDA 
IRENE C. LU* 
ABSTRACT 
The mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute those most responsible for the 1994 
Rwandan genocide is drawing to a close after nearly two decades.  
This Comment analyzes the substantive, structural, memorial, and 
symbolic inheritance that the ICTR bequeaths to international 
criminal law.  This unique area of international law is not only 
judge-made, but also developed through the norms and 
conventions of states, alongside the rich participation of non-
governmental actors and international policy-making agencies that 
define what norms become law.  Given this reality, the multi-
dimensional legacy of the Tribunal is fundamentally important in 
determining the forward movement of an area of law where such 
extra-legal influences are indeterminately determinative.  This 
Comment argues that, for all of the Tribunal’s flaws, and despite 
being originally set forth as a very specific type of criminal justice 
mechanism with a limited mandate and narrow jurisdiction, the 
ICTR has managed to further the field of international human 
rights through its perhaps unexpected contributions to memory, 
imagination, and hope at the heart of human rights. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people in Rwanda were killed in 
the short span of approximately 100 days between April 6 and 
mid-July of 1994 in one of the most brutally efficient and horrific 
massacres in history.1  On November 8, 1994, the International 
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created by Security 
Council Resolution 955 under Chapter VII2 of the United Nations 
Charter for the “sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible 
for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law”3 in the belief that establishment of the Tribunal 
and its prosecutions would “contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”4  
Thus, from its very founding, the ICTR was mandated to 
selectively prosecute those most responsible for the Rwandan 
genocide in the hope that these prosecutions would promote 
restorative justice to victims in Rwanda and reconciliation between 
Tutsis and Hutus in communities fractured by violence and 
bloodshed.  The Security Council, in Resolution 1503, laid out the 
Completion strategy of both the ICTR and its sister Tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), calling on 
both Tribunals to complete all trial activities by 2008 and all work 
by 2010, which was later extended to 2011.5  With Resolution 1966 
in December 2010, the Security Council also provided for the 
creation of a residual Mechanism that would continue the 
jurisdiction and manage the rights, obligations, and essential 
functions of the Tribunals.6  Nearly two decades since its inception, 
after completing seventy-five cases, seventeen of which are 
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1 The history and unfolding events of the Rwandan genocide are widely doc-
umented. See, e.g., ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE 
IN RWANDA (1999); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW 
WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998); GÉRARD 
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995); ROMÉO DALLAIRE, 
SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2003). 
2 See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51 (regarding the Security Council’s enforcement 
powers). 
3 S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
4 Id. at 1. 
5 S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
6 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5. 
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pending appeal and twelve of which are acquittals,7 nine accused 
still at large, and after referring two accused to France8 and eight to 
Rwanda,9 the Tribunal is finally closed.  The Arusha branch of the 
ICTR’s residual Mechanism began operations officially on July 1, 
2012; its opening marked the formal transfer of the Tribunal’s 
outstanding work and the official and symbolic closure of the 
ICTR’s doors.10  The ICTR is the first of the ad hoc Tribunals to 
close,11 heralding the end of the era of ad hoc courts.  This era has 
 
7 Of the completed cases, nine were guilty pleas and seventeen cases are on 
appeal. See Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/ 
Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
8 Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on the Prose-
cutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 
20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to 
France (Nov. 20, 2007).  
9 Prosecutor v. Ndimbati, Case No. ICTR-95-1F-R11bis, Decision on the Pros-
ecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Aloys Ndimbati to Rwanda (June 
25, 2012); Prosecutor v. Ryandikayo, Case No. ICTR-95-1E-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the case to the Republic of Rwanda (June 20, 
2012); Prosecutor v. Munyagishari, Case No. ICTR-5-89-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (June 6, 
2012); Prosecutor v. Ntaganzwa, Case No. ICTR-96-9-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (May 8, 
2012); Prosecutor v. Sikubwabo, Case No. ICTR-95-1D-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (Mar. 26, 
2012); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Feb. 22, 2012); Pros-
ecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011); Prosecutor v. 
Munyarugarama, Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14, Decision on Appeal against the Re-
ferral of Phénéas Munyarugarama’s Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to 
Strike (Oct. 5, 2012).  See also infra note 28.  Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 
2007 because the ICTR otherwise refused to transfer genocide suspect detainees to 
Rwanda’s jurisdiction under Rule 11bis of the Tribunal’s Completion Strategy that 
allows for transfer of cases to national jurisdictions. Rwanda Abolishes Death Penal-
ty, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/good-news/rwanda-abolishes-death-penalty-20070802. 
10 Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, Address to the United 
Nations Sec. Council: Six Monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR 
(Dec. 7, 2011); Press Release, ICTR, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribu-
nals (MICT) begins work in Arusha, ICTR/INFO-9-2-725.EN, (July 2, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1298.  
11 This includes the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
mandated to close in 2013, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) targeted to 
complete appellate proceedings in the case of Charles Taylor in late 2013 and close 
soon afterwards, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) with targeted closure in 
2015, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to close 
at an unspecified time.  See infra note 139 (noting the completion of the ICTY’s 
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arguably also passed with the creation of the permanent standing 
International Criminal Court (ICC) that has the jurisdiction to 
prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
within the territory of its signatory states.12 
As the work of the ICTR has wound down and now, with a 
record of nearly two decades behind it, the Tribunal is ripe for an 
assessment of its legacy.13  Indeed, the Tribunal itself has been 
 
mandate and the transfer of its residual obligations and functions to the Mecha-
nism on July 13, 2013); Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2012/21 (Oct. 9, 2012); see Ban Ki-Moon, Letter dated Feb. 16, 2012 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2012/101 (Feb. 17, 2012) (extending the mandate of the Tribunal for 
three years, from March 1, 2012 to March 1, 2015); see Law on the Establishment of 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended, 
Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/1004/006, art 47 (Oct. 27, 2004) (Cambodia), available 
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_ 
amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (explaining that “the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the courts of Cambodia shall automatically dissolve following the definitive con-
clusion of these proceedings”).  
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 arts. 5–8.  At the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC held in Kampala, Uganda, on June 11, 2010, amendments to the Statute were 
adopted that define the crime of aggression and set forth the conditions under 
which the Court will exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. However, the 
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression any earlier than Janu-
ary 1, 2017, with at least ratification of the Amendment by 30 states and activation 
of the jurisdiction by consensus action or a two-thirds vote.  Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6, Annex I (June 11, 2010). 
13 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law, Washington 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Lecture at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 
Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (July 3, 2012) (arguing 
that the Tribunal’s lack of indictment of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) members 
is not a “fatal flaw” in its legacy, but that its residual Mechanism now needs to 
undertake legacy work); Gabrielle McIntyre, The International Residual Mechanism 
and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 923 (2011) (arguing that the U.N. Security Coun-
cil has enabled the Judges of the residual Mechanism with the necessary tools to 
conduct proceedings of the highest standards); Adama Dieng, Capacity-Building 
Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 403 (2011) 
(arguing that the ICTR has a different, lesser-known legacy in its capacity-
building efforts and dissemination of public information to Rwandans); Catharine 
A. MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L. & COMP. 
L. 211 (2008) (stating that the Tribunal’s legacy includes substantive law, law of 
criminal responsibility, and the process of expanding world attention under inter-
national law on violations of sexual violence); Nigel Eltringham, “A War Crimes 
Community?”: The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Beyond 
Jurisprudence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309 (2008) (determining that the Tri-
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concerned with the question of how it will be remembered and 
judged.14  Assessments of its legacy cannot be free of the rubric of 
the original intent encompassed within its chartering mandate—to 
prosecute those most responsible for the genocide, to promote 
reconciliation, and to deter future crimes.  All the same, its legacy 
must also reflect the Tribunal’s immeasurable and perhaps 
intangible influence that will nevertheless have important 
repercussions for transitional justice and the culture of norms 
respecting human rights.  In this sense, assessing the Tribunal’s 
legacy is a much more expansive endeavor than simply assessing 
its contributions or its failures, about which there is much 
scholarship and criticism.15 
This Comment argues that the ICTR’s legacy is multi-
dimensional.  The ‘substantive’ legacy that the ICTR leaves is the 
landmark international criminal and humanitarian case law 
generated over the past two decades, which has been the 
traditional focus of the overwhelming majority of analyses of the 
Tribunal’s work and laudable contributions.  However, to only 
address its contributions that are most obviously related to its 
function and raison d’être would be neglectful of the other 
important, and perhaps unforeseen and unanticipated, 
contributions that the Tribunal may have made.  That is, the 
Tribunal’s legacy would not be complete without a discussion of 
other processes that the Tribunal has generated or set in motion.  
 
bunal’s legacy also includes the personal and professional experiences of its prac-
titioners). 
14 See Judge Dennis Byron, President of the ICTR, Address to the United Na-
tions Security Council: Six Monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the 
ICTR (Dec. 6, 2010) (“As our Tribunal, in its current form, draws to a close, we 
should all redouble our efforts to ensure its lasting legacy as a beacon for interna-
tional justice.”). 
15 See Luc Reydams, Let’s Be Friends: The United States, Post-Genocide Rwanda, 
and Victor’s Justice in Arusha (Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2197823 (arguing that the Tribunal was 
doomed from the start as a court of ‘victor’s justice,’ in part because of support 
from the United States for the RPF and Paul Kagame); Lars Waldorf, “A Mere Pre-
tense of Justice”: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tri-
bunal, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1221 (2010) (arguing that the ICTR Prosecutor’s fail-
ure to prosecute RPF crimes is a harbinger for how “complementarity” will play 
out at the ICC); Peter Erlinder, The U.N. Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: 
International Justice or Juridically-Constructed “Victor’s Impunity”? 4 DEPAUL J. SOC. 
JUST. 131 (2010) (“The ICTR’s one-sided prosecution threatens the legitimacy of the 
ICTR and calls into question all of its findings . . . .”). 
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This Comment argues that the Tribunal’s legacy encompasses 
not only its substantive, but also what can be categorized as its 
structural, memorial, and symbolic heritage.  The ‘structural’ 
legacy of the ICTR is the functional institutional heritage of a 
particular type of ad hoc, time-bound international criminal court 
structure and the unique residual Mechanism set up to manage the 
rights, obligations, and essential functions of the Tribunal.16  The 
structure of the Tribunal has had a direct impact on the judicial 
creativity and rich ‘laboratory’ of international law that has been 
generated by the Tribunal.  The ‘memorial’ legacy of the ICTR 
consists of the narratives generated through trials and in 
interviews of witnesses and victims, which add to the historical 
record and understanding of the genocide, which in turn, 
arguably, give voice to the memory and remembrance at the heart 
of collective responsibility.  Finally, ‘symbolic’ legacy is what the 
presence of the ICTR for the past two decades has meant in the 
public imagination:  a representation of the ideals of international 
justice, accountability, and the reach of the rule of law to all corners 
of the world over perpetrators of egregious crimes against 
humanity in order to end their impunity.  It also encompasses the 
significance of what it means for an ad hoc court to close and for its 
symbolism to be extinguished.  This Comment argues that 
altogether, the multi-dimensional legacy of the Tribunal is 
fundamentally important in determining the forward movement of 
an area of international law where such extra-legal influences are 
indeterminately determinative in generating a culture of norms 
fundamental to the respect and protection of human rights.17 
To be fair, not all of the Tribunal’s legacy is necessarily 
positive; to argue so would be to disregard the Tribunal’s 
shortcomings.18  Part 2 of this Comment describes the political and 
realpolitik constraints on the Tribunal’s operations that have 
haunted the Tribunal since its inception.  These political constraints 
on the functioning of the Tribunal have contributed to the mixed 
 
16 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5. 
17 Though it is important not to conflate human rights and international hu-
manitarian law (the “law of war” or “law of armed conflict”), humanitarian law is 
increasingly reflecting the influence of the human rights field through a “growing 
convergence . . . the blurring of thresholds of applicability, and the expansion of 
both systems . . . .”  Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 239, 240–42, 266–73 (2000). 
18 Id. 
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LU (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2013  6:37 PM 
2013]  MULTI-DIMENSIONAL LEGACY RWANDA TRIBUNAL 865 
reviews of its impact and will ultimately influence the final 
assessment of its legacy.  This Comment also lays out the definition 
with which to analyze ‘legacy’ and argues that this definition must 
include the enduring influence of the Tribunal’s work and 
processes on the ideals, conceptions, and instrumentalities of 
justice and human rights.  Part 3 of this Comment will give an 
overview of the major substantive legacy of the Tribunal in the 
area of international criminal law, where the ICTR’s jurisprudence 
has been generally recognized as most innovative and where it has 
changed the definitions of key legal concepts such as ‘genocide,’ 
‘crimes against humanity,’ and ‘sexual violence.’  Part 4 of this 
Comment will analyze the structural legacy of the Tribunal by 
focusing on the effects of the Tribunal’s unique, time-bound 
lifespan on judicial creativity, and discuss the mechanisms that it 
has employed to bring its mandate to a close.  This Part also 
considers the lessons that this process holds for the closure of other 
international criminal tribunals.  Part 5 will analyze the memorial 
legacy of the Tribunal by describing the Tribunal’s contributions to 
the generation of a record of the genocide that is necessary to 
collective memory and responsibility.  Finally, Part 6 will focus on 
the symbolic legacy of the Tribunal by analyzing the contributions 
of the Tribunal to public imagination through its performance of 
justice and what it has stood for in nearly two decades.  This 
Comment ends with concluding thoughts on the still evolving 
legacy of the Tribunal as its merits continue to be contested and 
mediated in the years ahead. 
2. THE FRACTIOUS BIRTH OF THE ICTR AND REALPOLITIK 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ITS INSTITUTIONAL ‘LEGACY’ 
What is a “legacy”?  In the context of international tribunals, 
one scholar has noted that: 
Legacy can be defined as a . . . lasting impact, most notably on 
bolstering the rule of law in a particular society by conducting 
effective trials while also strengthening domestic capacity 
to do so.  It includes the extent to which a court has had a 
“demonstration effect” by modeling best practices in handling 
the individual cases and compiling a historical record of the 
conflict.  Legacy should also lay the groundwork for future efforts 
to prevent a recurrence of crimes by offering precedents for 
legal reform, building faith in judicial processes, and 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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promoting greater civic engagement on issues of 
accountability and justice.19 
Similarly, the 2008 UN High Commissioner’s Report on 
maximizing the legacy of hybrid courts also defines ‘legacy’ as a 
“lasting impact on bolstering the rule of law in a particular society, 
by conducting effective trials to contribute to ending impunity, 
while also strengthening domestic judicial capacity.  The aim is for 
this impact to continue even after the work of the . . . court is 
complete.”20  The Report continues to assert that the need for 
tribunals to leave a legacy is “now firmly accepted as part of 
United Nations policy,” citing the Secretary General’s 2004 
statement that “it is essential that, from the moment any future 
international or hybrid tribunal is established, consideration be 
given, as a priority, to the ultimate exit strategy and intended 
legacy in the country concerned.”21  These definitions of the legacy 
of international tribunals focus narrowly on the legal legacy 
generated by their legal processes, that is, the impact that effective 
trials will have on domestic judicial and legal institutions, and 
whether they can deter impunity worldwide.  However, in 
focusing only on the legal, these definitions of legacy miss the rich 
and varied influences that the tribunal can leave in other areas that 
also fundamentally affect the pursuit of justice and human rights. 
Professors King and Meernik, in assessing the work of the 
ICTY, have developed the following four-pronged framework for 
describing the core missions in the ICTY’s mandate “to bring to 
justice those responsible for serious violations” of international 
humanitarian law:  (1) developing the Tribunal’s functional and 
institutional capacities; (2) interpreting, applying, and developing 
international humanitarian and criminal law; (3) attending to and 
interacting with the various stakeholders who have vested 
interests; (4) promoting deterrence and fostering peace-building to 
 
19 Caitlin Reiger, Where to from Here for International Tribunals? Considering 
Legacy and Residual Issues, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, Sept. 
2009, at 1, available at http://ictj.org/publication/where-here-international-
tribunals (italics added). 
20 OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR 
POST-CONFLICT STATES: MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF HYBRID COURTS, at 4–5, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/08/2, UN Sales No. E.08.XIV.2 (2008). 
21 Id. (citing to UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. 
S/2004/616, ¶ 46). 
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prevent future aggression and conflict.”22  Their goal in developing 
this framework was to delineate a “more explicit conceptualization 
and methodology for assessing the Tribunal’s impact” given its 
mandate.23  This framework is also applicable to the ICTR as it was 
charged with the same mandate, but with the addition of 
promoting national reconciliation in Rwanda that can be 
categorized under the third prong of the framework as attending to 
various stakeholders.  King and Meernik’s framework is a starting 
point for this Comment’s assessment of the Tribunal’s legacy, 
which encompasses all of the factors within the framework.   
Here, it is important to delineate the difference between impact 
and legacy.  The former addresses a temporally bound 
consequence of the Tribunal’s work within demarcated sectors of 
influence, while the latter refers to a temporal and context-
independent conception of influence and perception that may be 
less directly associated with the sectors with which law and justice 
are traditionally associated.  Ultimately, legacy is a more expansive 
assessment of institutional influence than impact.  In this 
Comment, ‘legacy’ will be defined as the enduring influence of the 
Tribunal’s work and processes on the ideals, conceptions, and 
instrumentalities of justice and human rights. 
In assessing the ICTR’s legacy, it is important to situate the 
Tribunal within the constraints of international and regional 
politics and acknowledge the reality of these constraints on its 
functioning during its operations and on its final legacy.24  First, 
while the idea of setting up an international criminal tribunal to 
prosecute high-ranking genocide suspects first came at the request 
of Rwanda,25 it later withdrew its support for the creation of the 
Tribunal over major disputes regarding three issues:  the temporal 
jurisdiction that the Tribunal would have; its proposed location 
outside of Rwanda; and the lack of a death penalty for the worst 
offenders of the genocide under the international law of the 
Tribunal when, paradoxically, lower-level offenders were subject 
 
22 Kimi L. King & James D. Meernik, Assessing the Impact of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing International and Local Interests 
While Doing Justice, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7, 8 (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011). 
23 Id. at 11. 
24 See generally Reiger, supra note 19. 
25 VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: 
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 158 (2008). 
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to the death penalty in Rwandan courts under its penal code.26  The 
ICTR’s narrow temporal and geographical jurisdiction is the 1994 
calendar year (January 1 to December 31) for crimes committed 
within the territory of Rwanda and crimes committed in 
neighboring countries by Rwandan citizens.27  Specifically, this 
limited temporal jurisdiction was the result of the Security Council 
member states’ tense negotiations with Rwanda.  During these 
negotiations, Rwanda pushed hard (i) to advance the start date of 
the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction in order to cover those 
responsible for organizing the genocide during a “long period of 
[prior] planning”28 and (ii) to limit the boundaries of this temporal 
jurisdiction, thus making it impossible for the Tribunal to 
prosecute atrocities by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and 
post-genocide revenge killings against Hutu génocidaires and 
civilians.29  Since the genocide, the RPF has dominated Rwanda’s 
government under the leadership of Paul Kagame, who became 
Vice President and Minister of Defense immediately after the 
genocide and then President in March 2000.30  At the Security 
Council meeting concerning the establishment of the Tribunal, the 
Rwandan representative lodged his country’s strong opposition to 
locating the Tribunal outside of Rwanda, noting that the location of 
the Tribunal was essential 
 
26 Rwanda’s death penalty sentence originates in Organic Law No. 08/1996 
of August 31, 1996, on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting 
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since October 1, 
1990 (Rwanda), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4f64.htm, was later repealed un-
der Organic Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, relating to the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty (Rwanda).  See Victor Peskin, Conflicts of Justice - An Analysis of the 
Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 128, 132 
(2000) (“[T]he death penalty lies at the heart of what it means to deliver justice for 
victims and survivors of the genocide.”). 
27 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 
art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
28 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994), in 
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR RWANDA 298, 308 (1998) (including a speech of the Rwandan delegate to the 
United Nations following a vote to create the ICTR).   
29 PESKIN, supra note 25, at 162 (“[T]he tribunal’s narrow temporal mandate 
compromised the court’s capacity to deter and prosecute post-1994 atrocities 
committed by both the RPF and the exiled génocidaires.”).  
30 Biography, PAULKAGAME.COM, http://www.paulkagame.com/2010/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=54&lang=en (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2012). 
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to teach the Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the 
impunity to which it had become accustomed . . . and to 
promote national reconciliation.  It therefore seems clear 
that the seat of the International Tribunal should be set in 
Rwanda; it will have to deal with Rwandese suspects, 
responsible for crimes committed in Rwanda against the 
Rwandese.31 
The representative argued that the lack of capital punishment 
for those who “devised, planned and organized the genocide” was 
“not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.”32  By a quirk 
of fate, Rwanda sat as a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council during deliberations and it ultimately cast the sole 
dissenting vote in the Security Council against the establishment of 
the Tribunal.33 
Rwanda’s opposition to the Tribunal, both initially and later, 
underscores the politics of war crimes tribunals and the state 
cooperation that is vital to the functioning of an international 
criminal court with no inherent powers.34  The Tribunal’s 
dependence on state cooperation was exacerbated by its structural 
arrangement whereby the movement of its witnesses and 
investigators was directly dependent on a state with, at times, 
radically diverging interests.  For example, on the morning of June 
7, 2002, a group of witnesses testifying for alleged Hutu génocidaires 
arrived on the tarmac at Kigali International Airport for a two-hour 
flight to the courtrooms of the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania—only to 
find that Rwanda had deliberately instituted travel restrictions that 
blocked them from leaving the country.35  As one commentator 
noted, “[t]he wheels of international justice ground to an abrupt 
halt until August, when the Rwandan government finally allowed 
witnesses to travel to the tribunal.”36  Against the backdrop of 
Rwanda’s obstruction of the Tribunal’s legal processes was then-
ICTR Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s decision in December 
 
31 U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 308. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 299. 
34 See PESKIN, supra note 25, at 7 (describing the "soft power" [of tribunals] as 
“the capacity to affect change in the behavior of external actors by a multiplicity of 
strategies that do not depend on actual enforcement” and the vulnerability of tri-
bunals as a result of the lack of enforcement powers). 
35 Id. at 3. 
36 Id. 
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2000 to expand ICTR investigations into RPF atrocities,37 followed 
by her outspoken criticism of Rwanda’s non-compliance with her 
request,38 and finally her warning that she would issue indictments 
against RPF soldiers by the end of 2002.39  Ultimately, no 
indictments were ever made against RPF soldiers by Del Ponte or 
her successors, in part because of the recognition that to do so 
would likely impair the Tribunal’s ability to carry out its work.40 
The Tribunal’s failure to prosecute Tutsi RPF atrocities committed 
by the then-rebel force of the current Rwandan President Paul 
Kagame, and to instead focus only on Hutu perpetrators of the 
genocide, has unfortunately tainted the Tribunal’s work with 
aspersions that it renders only “victor’s justice.”41 
The Rwandan government’s animosity and strategically 
obstructionist policy toward the Tribunal, the Tribunal’s limited 
temporal jurisdiction, and its distant location from the people for 
whom justice was supposed to be garnered—compounded later by 
the Tribunal’s limited outreach to inform Rwandans of its 
activities42—would foreshadow some of the major problems and 
critiques that have persistently dogged the Tribunal.43  Views of 
 
37 Id. at 207. 
38 See id. at 208 (noting that this first public criticism “marked the beginning 
of an escalating confrontation with [Rwanda’s] government”). 
39 Id. at 207–31 (addressing the Security Council on Oct. 30, 2002, to “thwart 
Rwanda’s counter-shaming campaign against the tribunal”).  
40 See id. at 228 (“[ICTR Prosecutor Hassan] Jallow’s current sidestepping of 
the RPF issue may be a strategic gambit designed to forestall conflict with the 
Rwanda government and secure its ongoing cooperation.”).  In 2009, Jallow an-
nounced that he would not indict RPF soldiers for the reported killings of 30,000 
Hutus in 1994.  U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 
(June 4, 2009).  See also Letter from Human Rights Watch to ICTR Chief Prosecutor 
Hassan Jallow (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2009/08/14/letter-ictr-chief-prosecutor-hassan-jallow-response-his-letter-
prosecution-rpf-crime (requesting that the ICTR Chief Prosecutor prosecute RPF 
crimes committed in 1994 in order to “stand against impunity and to ensure ac-
countability for these crimes”). 
41 Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
49, 51 (2011). 
42 But see Adama Dieng, Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind 
of Legacy, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 403, 405 (2011) (describing the Tribunal’s “capac-
ity-building legacy that consists of workshops, trainings, and the dissemination of 
public information” which has an impact on the daily lives of Rwandans). 
43 See generally Waldorf, supra note 15 (detailing the problems of complemen-
tary national trials with international tribunals, namely that the national proceed-
ings are shams and international justice is inherently political); Haskell & Wal-
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the Tribunal within Rwanda at different times have ranged from 
indifference or apathy, since trials are “remote from most ordinary 
people, both geographically and socially,” to opinions that the 
Tribunal is a “blatantly biased and evil institution” that “maintains 
an oppressive regime and silences the violence of which the Hutu 
were victims.”44  Moreover, the reconciliation at the heart of the 
ICTR’s mandate may not have come to pass as many Rwandans 
choose the strategy of deliberate forgetting rather than 
reconciling,45 perhaps partly because the formal and impersonal 
nature of structured trials may fail to address specific public health 
needs generated by mass violence.46  As one scholar has argued, 
“[b]y denying the legitimacy and social authority of ‘local 
determinations’ with their critical and constructive potential, 
international criminal jurisprudence often sacrifices the possibility 
of reconciliation for the normative framework entailed by 
 
dorf, supra note 41 (discussing the negative consequences of the ICTR’s failure to 
prosecute RPF atrocities such as leaving a “legacy of ‘victor’s justice,’” painting an 
“inaccurate and incomplete picture” of Rwanda in 1994, and setting a “bad prece-
dent for international justice”). 
44 Peter Uvin & Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in 
Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 222, 225 (2003).  See also Timothy Longman et 
al., Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Rec-
onciliation in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 206 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) 
(conducting a 2002 study of over 2000 Rwandans in four communes, which found 
“[s]trong support for the idea that the ICTR should be held in Rwanda and the 
evidence that people feel ill-informed about the ICTR may indicate that people 
support gacaca because it is closer to them and therefore more transparent.  A sub-
stantial portion of people also responded that they were not informed about the 
[ICTR] Rwandan trials . . .”). 
45 See, e.g., Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a 
Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 76 AFRICA 131, 131 (2006) 
(arguing that the lack of post-conflict social transformation has led to chosen am-
nesia as a deliberate form of coexistence for Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, but that 
this coping mechanism “bears the danger of not challenging the social cleavages 
that rendered the genocide possible in the first place, and so obstructing their 
transformation in the future”).  But see HUM. RTS. WATCH, RWANDA: JUSTICE 
COMPROMISES: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA’S COMMUNITY-BASED GACACA COURTS 95-98 
(2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover_0.pdf 
(pointing to some Rwandans who use gacaca trials in order to advance revenge 
motives and settle old scores that may or may not be genocide-related). 
46 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 302 (including a speech, di-
rectly following voting on the Resolution that created the ICTR, by the Czech Re-
public’s representative to the United Nations declaring that “[j]ustice is one thing; 
reconciliation, however, is another.  The Tribunal might become a vehicle of jus-
tice, but it is hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation”). 
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retribution.”47  Where the ICTR has attempted to support domestic 
initiatives at building the capacity of Rwandan courts and its legal 
system, this attempt has also arguably been met with resistance 
and opposition, and seen limited returns.48  It is not surprising that 
in a different, but problematic parallel process to the trials of the 
ICTR, Rwanda’s domestic gacaca (Kinyarwanda for “grass”) courts 
modeled on traditional local community customs to resolve 
conflicts, are more immediately relevant to Rwandans.49  This is 
perhaps because the Rwandan Government expressly aimed to 
encourage community participation and to “make ordinary 
Rwandans the main actors in the process of dispensing justice and 
fostering reconciliation” where they are not at the ICTR.50  It is also 
likely that the sheer number of cases—1.2 million—that have been 
tried since 2005 in more than 12,000 community-based courts 
involving countless participants, make the gacaca process far more 
relevant to Rwandans than the distant trials at the ICTR.51  
Ultimately, the history of the ICTR has been marred by tensions 
between its competing stakeholders: the international community 
and Rwandans.52 
Specifically, within the framework that King and Meernik 
conceptualized are two sets of constituencies broadly identified: 
international and local, under each of which are multiple sets of 
stakeholders to whom the Tribunal is responsible.53  Here, the 
international community is broadly defined as major state powers, 
national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and 
 
47 Jason Benjamin Fink, Deontological Retributivism and the Legal Practice of In-
ternational Jurisprudence: The Case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
49 J. AFR. L. 101, 102 (2005).  See also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 26 (1998) (dis-
cussing the lexicon of potential responses to collective violence, and specifically, 
the failure of trials to facilitate reconciliation since “[r]econciliation is not a goal of 
criminal trials except in the most abstract sense”). 
48 See Dieng, supra note 42.  See also S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 5 (calling “on 
the international community to assist national jurisdictions, as part of the comple-
tion strategy, in improving their capacity to prosecute cases transferred from the 
ICTY and the ICTR . . .”). 
49 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 45 (stating the achievements and failures 
of the gacaca courts and “the use of gacaca to settle personal and political scores, 
corruption, and procedural irregularities”). 
50  Id. at 2. 
51 Id. at 1. 
52 Id. 
53 See King & Meernik, supra note 22, at 7, 11–14. 
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nongovernmental organizations, whose members are principally 
concerned with the interpretation of international humanitarian 
laws, and the effectiveness and efficiency while doing so.54  The 
local constituency are those who were “victims, villains, or 
bystanders in the atrocities committed,” and for whom “interests 
are more intensely personal” and complicated by often conflicting 
goals, especially across ethnic groups where conflict was divided 
along those lines.55  King and Meernik argue that institutional, 
political, and practical constraints, coupled with limits on its 
powers, mean that, in reality, the ICTY is not able to respond to its 
constituents in the former Yugoslavia.56 
Similarly, the bifurcation of ’constituencies‘ is also appropriate 
in the case of the ICTR that—perhaps more starkly than the ICTY 
vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia—has straddled the divide between 
its international character and efforts at helping Rwandans in the 
process of recovering, rehabilitation, restoration, or the 
combination thereof.  Also, similarly, the ICTR has arguably not 
achieved its broad and vaguely stated goals for its local 
constituency because of institutional, political, and practical 
limitations.  This Comment focuses mainly on the ICTR’s legacy to 
the international community, in recognition that the Tribunal as a 
vehicle for reconciliation and social mending may have been 
impracticable from the start, hindered by regional politics and 
international realpolitik; perhaps this had always existed as a 
secondary goal assumed to be the natural by-product of punishing 
perpetrators, and of doing justice.  Moreover, as King and Meernik 
argue, where local and international interests conflict, “the 
preponderance of influence tends to reside with actors and 
interests at the international level” because the ICTY (and ICTR) 
are subject to the oversight of the UN, a relationship similar to that 
of principal-agent.57  The Tribunal’s likely failure to address the 
needs of one important group of its ’stakeholders,’ Rwandans, is 
acknowledged here. 
However, this Comment argues that the Tribunal’s impact has 
been profound despite its shortcomings, and also outside of its 
contributions to substantive international law.  This impact, such 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 12. 
56 See generally id.  
57 Id. at 13–14. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
LU (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2013  6:37 PM 
874 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:4 
as deterrence, norms building, strengthening the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights, is not discrete and measurable, nor can 
its causality necessarily be traced and isolated.58  However, this 
impact, where it lasts and continues to influence future institutions 
as well as legal, social, and political norms, becomes a legacy.  This 
Comment suggests that the ICTR’s contributions in the following 
areas will become its multiple legacies. 
3. SUBSTANTIVE LEGACY OF INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 
The substantive legacy of the ICTR is comprised of its major 
contributions to the development of international criminal law 
jurisprudence.  This contribution is one area of the Tribunal’s 
legacy about which a voluminous amount of literature has been 
generated.59  This Part of the Comment will focus on the Tribunal’s 
most significant, precedent-setting contributions. 
At the very outset, it is important to note that, as a formal 
matter, the ICTR’s ability to make these substantive and creative 
contributions originated in its use of the category—‘general 
principles of law‘—a well-known source of international law, in 
crafting legal doctrine.60  While these general principles are 
thought to represent a subsidiary source of law, the ICTR, much 
like other international criminal tribunals, has needed to use it in 
order to fill gaps and generate clear principles from unclear rules 
and statements of law.61  In so doing, it departed from the practices 
 
58 See THEODOR MERON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE 
VIEW FROM THE BENCH 150 (2011) (“It is very difficult to establish a direct causal 
link between the verdicts of international criminal tribunals and increased respect 
for international humanitarian law.  Nonetheless, I believe there is a correlation 
between the founding and work of the various international criminal tribunals in 
the 1990s and early 2000s and the increased attention given to international hu-
manitarian law by armed forces.”). 
59 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
(Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CREATIVITY] 
(documenting many of these contributions in individual essays); NICHOLAS A. 
JONES, THE COURTS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA AND 
ARUSHA 132–55 (2010) (detailing the jurisprudential contributions of the ICTR); 
Erik Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920, 920 (2005) (de-
scribing the principal achievements of the ICTR). 
60 Fabian O. Raimondo, General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity, and the 
Development of International Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY 45, supra note 59, 
at 45. 
61 Id. at 46. 
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of other non-ad hoc tribunals.62  Of the ICTR’s substantive 
contributions, three in particular deserve special mention and 
analysis: (i) its construction of the crime of ‘genocide’; (ii) its 
contribution to the jurisprudence of sexual violence; and (iii) its 
expansion of the crime of incitement. 
3.1.   The Meaning and Definition of ’Genocide’ 
Article 2(2) of the ICTR statute defines the crime of genocide.63  
One of the unique features of the definition is its insistence on 
establishing a special intent, or a “dolus specialis.”64  It is this 
requirement that takes the act of killing from being an ordinary 
crime to an international one.65  The ICTR’s case of Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu66 in 1998 was the first conviction for genocide by an 
international court.67  Jean-Paul Akayesu was charged with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions for his role as the bourgmestre of Taba 
commune, where at least 2000 Tutsis were killed and numerous 
women were subject to multiple acts of sexual violence.68  Akayesu, 
as mayor of the commune, executed executive functions, exercised 
exclusive control over the communal police and gendarmes at the 
disposition of the commune, and held responsibility for the 
execution of laws and the administration of justice.69  In the 
Judgment, the Tribunal paid special attention to the problems 
inherent in proving genocide and, recognizing this issue, 
established that the special intent for genocide did not require only 
direct evidence, but “can be inferred from a certain number of 
presumptions of fact,” and “the general context of the perpetration 
of other . . . acts directed against that same group.”70  This ruling  
marked a major advance in the jurisprudence of genocide by 
 
62 Id. 
63 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 27, 
art. 2(2). 
64  Payam Akhavan, The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 989, 992 (2005). 
65 Id. at 992–93. 
66 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998). 
67 JONES, supra note 59, at 138. 
68 Akayesu, supra note 66, § 1.2 Indictment. 
69 Id. § 1.2, ¶ 4. 
70 Id. ¶ 523. 
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providing prosecutors and tribunals with a workable mechanism 
for satisfying the special intent component of the definition. 
A second contribution of the Akayesu judgment was in its 
understanding of who constituted a ’group‘ for the crime of 
genocide.71  The definition of genocide requires establishing that 
certain actions were committed against “a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group.”72  Since the Tutsi were ethnically and 
linguistically identical to the Hutu in Rwanda, they were incapable 
of meeting the express requirements of the definition.73  The ICTR 
in Akayesu viewed the definition’s categories as non-exhaustive 
and concluded that the crime could apply to any group that was 
“stable and permanent.”74  In so doing, it effectively put to rest the 
threshold question of whether genocide had been committed in 
Rwanda as a matter of international law. 
Emboldened by this interpretation, later panels of the ICTR 
have adopted similarly creative and purposive approaches to 
interpreting a “group” in the definition of genocide, with the 
understanding that failing to do so would result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.75 
3.2.  The Jurisprudence of Sexual Violence 
Arguably, the ICTR’s biggest substantive contribution lies in its 
contribution to the understanding of sexual violence when actively 
employed during a conflict.76  During the course of the Rwandan 
 
71 Akhavan, supra note 64, at 999. 
72 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 27, 
art. 2(2). 
73 Akhavan, supra note 64, at 1000–1. 
74 See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶ 701.  The Chamber also noted that there were 
“a number of objective indicators of the group as a group with a distinct identity” 
including, reference by the Rwandan Constitution and Civil Code in force at the 
time, the Arusha Accords, customary rules, self-identity and subjective percep-
tion.  Id. ¶ 170. 
75 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 98 (May 21, 1999) (adopting expansive definitions of ethnic, racial, 
and religious groups); see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 376 (Dec. 6, 1999) (concluding that the Tutsi group is “characterized 
by its stability and permanence” and thus constitutes a distinct group protected 
by the Genocide Convention). 
76 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW 
ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211 (2008) (discussing the accomplishments and shortfalls 
of the ICTR’s treatment of sexual violence); Rebecca L. Haffajee, Prosecuting Crimes 
of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise 
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genocide, rape was systematically committed on a massive scale, 
where between 250,000 and 500,000 rapes were estimated to have 
been perpetrated; “rape was the rule and its absence the 
exception,” U.N. Special Rapporteur Réne Degni-Ségui concluded 
in his Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda.77  
Akayesu is also the same watershed case for the redefinition of the 
crime of sexual violence in conflict.  Specifically, in the Taba 
commune where Jean-Paul Akayesu was bourgmestre, hundreds of 
displaced civilians were taken hostage by local militia and/or 
communal police and often subjected to multiple incidences of 
sexual violence, sometimes by multiple assailants and frequently 
accompanied by torture and death.78  Originally, charges of sexual 
violence and rape were not part of the indictment against Akayesu 
despite overwhelming evidence of such, but on questioning by 
Judge Navanethem Pillay of South Africa, the only female judge at 
the ICTR at the time, rape became front and center at the trial and 
garnered the encouragement of women’s groups.  The trial was 
suspended and delayed in order for the Prosecutor to amend the 
indictment to include charges of sexual violence.79 
In its final judgment, the Tribunal noted that “rape is a form of 
aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape 
cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body 
parts.”80  The Tribunal instead defined the crime of rape as “a 
physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive” and defined sexual violence as 
“any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
 
Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 201, 202 (2006) (arguing for the “targeted use of 
[joint criminal enterprise] theory in effectively prosecuting crimes of rape and 
sexual violence at the ICTR”).   
77 See Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Rep. on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 (Jan. 29 
1996) (by René Degni-Ségui) (noting that “[r]ape was systematic” during the mas-
sacres). 
78 See Akayesu, supra note 66, § 1.2, (charging Jean Paul Akayesu with being 
responsible, as bourgmestre (mayor), for the killing of 2,000 Tutsis in Taba). 
79 See When Rape Becomes Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at A10 (“[In mak-
ing rape part of Mr. Akeyesu’s [sic] genocide conviction, the decision also ad-
vances the world’s legal treatment of rape and sexual violence.”); see also Prosecu-
tor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-I, Amended Indictment, ¶ 12B (Jan. 1, 1996) 
(charging that Jean Paul Akayesu knew that acts of sexual violence were being 
committed).  
80  See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶ 687.  
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circumstances which are coercive.”81  Here, the Tribunal effectively 
dispensed with the need to show the absence of consent 
independently, making it perhaps the most groundbreaking 
advance in gender jurisprudence worldwide82 given how 
meaningless consent is in circumstances of conflict.83  The Tribunal 
further noted that “[s]exual violence is not limited to physical 
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not 
involve penetration or even physical contact,” explicitly referring 
to the incident where Akayesu ordered militia to undress a female 
student and made her perform gymnastics in a public courtyard, as 
constituting an act of sexual violence.84  Here, the Tribunal made 
clear that “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a 
show of physical force.  Threats, intimidation, extortion and other 
forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute 
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances.”85  
This broad definition of coercion is not only reflective of the reality 
that consent is meaningless in the circumstances of extreme 
inequality, such as those acts of a sexual nature with a nexus to 
armed conflict, genocide, and campaigns of crimes against 
humanity, but also “portentously” suggests that contexts of 
inequality are located along a continuum of settings that may not 
yet be “recognized as systematic, widespread, or group-based.”86  
In addition to expanding the definitions of the crimes of sexual 
violence and rape, the Tribunal in Akayesu also became the first to 
recognize that acts of sexual violence when committed in 
 
81 Id. ¶ 598. 
82 See Kelly D. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003, 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 17 (2004) (reflecting 
that the Akayesu case was groundbreaking because it explicitly recognized rape 
“as an instrument of genocide and a crime against humanity” for the first time in 
history).  
83 See ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 455 
(2005) (discussing how “with regard to the definition of rape, the ICC EoC [Ele-
ments of Crimes] do not focus on the issue of non-consent, but rather on force, 
threat of force, coercion or a coercive environment”); MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 
212 (noting that the Tribunal’s greatest substantive accomplishment was its defini-
tion of rape and acknowledgment that “consent is meaningless”).  
84 See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶ 688. 
85 Id. 
86 MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 212–13. 
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furtherance of genocide could themselves amount to acts of 
genocide.87 
The decisions in several subsequent cases, including Prosecutor 
v. Semanza, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, and Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, all 
described only the physical elements of the act of rape as set out in 
Kunarac, and seemed to shift their analyses away from the 
conceptual definition established in Akayesu.88  However, the 
Tribunal in the case of Prosecutor v. Muhimana reiterated its 
definition of rape used in Akayesu and found the accused guilty of 
rape as a crime against humanity.89  The significance of the 
Tribunal’s efforts in the area of criminalizing sexual violence are 
borne out in the fact that the ICC treaty came to abandon the idea 
of consent in its own definitions of rape and enforced prostitution, 
and instead absorbed the definition created by the ICTR wherein 
the element of consent is irrelevant and absent.90 
More recently, in June 2011, in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Nyiramasuhuko, the Tribunal convicted a woman for the first time 
in the history of international criminal law91 for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and for the instigation of rape as a crime against 
humanity.92  That women do participate in and perpetrate horrific 
acts of sexual violence during conflict is well-documented.  
However, that they are held responsible for their participation or 
 
87 See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶¶ 674–75. 
88 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 
506 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶ 912 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 99-
54A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 707 (Jan. 22, 2004).  
89 See Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence, ¶¶ 501, 563 (Apr. 28, 2005) (“[A]n accused incurs criminal liability if he 
causes serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.”).  
90 See MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 212 n.4 (describing that “taking advantage 
of a coercive environment” is a form of force recognized in the ICC definitions of 
rape and enforced prostitution as crimes against humanity). 
91 Nyirmansuhuko was the first woman convicted by an international tribu-
nal, but Biljana Plavšić, a former President of Republika Srpska and a professor at 
the University of Sarajevo, had entered into a plea bargain with the ICTY on De-
cember 16, 2002 to one count of crimes against humanity for her part in targeting 
Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and other non-Serb populations of thirty-seven 
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  See generally Prosecutor v. Plavšić, 
Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Feb. 27, 2003) (describing her 
crimes and sentencing). 
92 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR 98-42-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence, ¶ 6200 (June 24, 2011) (finding Nyiramasuhuko guilty on seven counts of 
the Indictment). 
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incitement of sexual violence is more rare.  This lack of conviction 
is likely because women have seldom held such positions of 
control and authority as did Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, who was 
appointed, ironically, as the Minister of Family and Women’s 
Development in the Interim Government of Rwanda.93  This ICTR 
decision again symbolizes the Tribunal’s breaking of new grounds 
in judicial decision-making in the area of sexual violence, 
demonstrating that no one—man or woman—is immune from 
judgment.  As noted legal scholar of sexual violence and gender 
crimes, Professor Catharine MacKinnon poignantly observes: 
No shortfall can overshadow the ICTR’s biggest 
accomplishment, one it shares with the survivors of sexual 
atrocities: expanded world attention under international 
law to these violations . . . . And it has been in the ICTR, not 
in the ICTY, that it has truly begun . . . . This legacy, among 
many others, can never be erased.94 
3.3.   The Crime of Incitement 
The third major advance that the ICTR made in the 
jurisprudence of international criminal law is in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, also known as the Media Case.95  The case 
involved the prosecution of three individuals, two of which were 
actively involved in operating the infamous Milles Colline radio 
station in Rwanda that broadcasted messages relating to the 
extermination of Tutsis and identified specific targets for 
violence.96  The defendants were convicted for the crimes of direct 
and public incitement to commit the crime of genocide, and for 
persecution as a crime against humanity.97  In developing these 
crimes, the ICTR drew liberally from the international law on hate 
speech.98  It recognized the media to have caused the acts of 
genocide directly, and was able to attribute these actions to the 
 
93 Id. ¶ 244. 
94 MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 220. 
95 See Muhimana, supra note 89. 
96 Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. 
97 Id. ¶¶ 1105–08. 
98 Id. ¶ 980.  For a first-hand account by the Author of the opinion discussing 
the motivation behind the Tribunal’s approach, see Navanethem Pillay, Freedom of 
Speech and Incitement to Criminal Activity: A Delicate Balance, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 203, 208–09 (2008). 
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defendants.99  In so doing, the Tribunal likened the media to the 
“bullets” in a gun that were loaded with messages of ethnic hatred 
and violence.100  The defendants were found to be directly guilty, 
and their words were not treated as mere instrumentalities, but 
rather as deeds in and of themselves designed to kill.101 
The Tribunal’s logic behind its opinion and expansion of the 
law is well-captured by its observation that “[t]he power of the 
media to create and destroy fundamental human values comes 
with great responsibility.  Those who control such media are 
accountable for its consequences.”102  On appeal, the Tribunal’s 
Appeals Chamber confirmed the lower court’s approach to the 
crime in large measure.103  While some have since questioned the 
legitimacy of the Tribunal’s approach and claimed that its 
jurisprudence applied a new crime to the defendants 
retroactively,104 others have considered it an important mechanism 
to hold individuals in control of mass media accountable for their 
actions.  The significance of the decision is in its signaling that 
“hate speech can constitute international law’s most heinous 
crimes” independently.105 
* * * 
Though the Tribunal is associated with other substantive 
contributions—such as its decisions on the “nexus” requirement 
for crimes against humanity106 and its procedural rules on trying 
 
99 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 
¶¶ 952–53 (Dec. 3, 2003). 
100 See id. ¶ 953 (finding three media executives guilty, inter alia, of genocide, 
direct and public incitement to genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide).   
101 Id. ¶ 974–75. 
102 Id. ¶ 945. 
103 Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 775 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
104 See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of 
Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 17, 17–33 (2005) (de-
scribing the opinion as troubling, unpersuasive, and raising issues of retroactive 
justice). 
105 International Law—Genocide—U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass Media Hate 
Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes against Humanity—
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (Media Case), 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2769, 2769 (2004).  
106 See John Cerone, The Jurisprudential Contributions of the ICTR to the Legal 
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity—The Evolution of the Nexus Requirement, 14 
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191, 191 (2008) (arguing that among the ICTR’s most 
significant contributions to the jurisprudential development of international crim-
inal law is the “evolution of the notion of Crimes Against Humanity and the nec-
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multiple accused at one trial107—the above-mentioned are 
significant in terms of the Tribunal’s contributions to the 
jurisprudence of international criminal law.  Indeed, their 
significance is borne out by the immense impact that they have had 
and by most predictions will continue to have in the future 
development of international criminal law. 
4. STRUCTURAL LEGACY OF A TRANSIENT TRIBUNAL 
The Tribunal was set up intentionally as an ad hoc tribunal with 
a finite life span.  This time-bound structure is unique in the 
functioning of a court because “in ordinary contexts, courts are not 
temporary” and their permanence is the very basis of their 
legitimacy and source of authority.108  However, the ICTR did not 
have permanence as the basis for its legitimacy and source of 
authority.  Instead, the Tribunal had only the variable financial 
support of the Security Council and the dubious weight of moral 
authority at the time.109  This Section argues that the explicit 
bounded temporality of the ICTR fostered an environment ripe for 
judges to engage in creative lawmaking, because they readily 
recognized the fleeting nature of their opportunity to use the 
events of the genocide to contribute to the development of the 
general body of international criminal law.  With limited time, and 
nothing to lose, so to speak, they were freed to transcend the 
traditional barriers to judicial lawmaking such as:  deferring to law 
made by other agencies, limiting themselves to explicitly 
prescribed sources of law, and limiting decisions to the narrow 
facts at hand—and were thereby able to enlarge the very 
boundaries of international criminal law. 
 
essary link between individual crimes and the broader attack that raises such 
crimes to the level of international regulation”). 
107 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52T, Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 953 (Dec. 3, 2003).  
108 See Reiger, supra note 19, at 1.  See also Guido Acquaviva, Was a Residual 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Really Necessary?, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 789, 790-91 (2011) (“[T]he elaboration of the so-called ‘completion strategies’ 
of both ad hoc Tribunals, should have probably led to profound reflections on the 
special nature of courts of law endowed with a limited temporal jurisdiction from 
the outset.”). 
109 See HANS KÖCHLER, GLOBAL JUSTICE OR GLOBAL REVENGE?: INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 166–71 (2003) (arguing that the ICTY and 
ICTR fell short of the basic separation of powers necessary for fairness and impar-
tiality in functioning because of the Security Council’s extensive role in its crea-
tion). 
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The very idea of international criminal justice is in tension with 
the bedrock principle of state sovereignty because the former 
purports to have direct applicability to individuals in states who 
are in turn subject to those states’ exclusive sovereignty.110  
Antonio Cassese, former President of the ICTY and first President 
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, made an apt observation in 
noting that international law is an edifice built on the volcano of 
state sovereignty.111  Judge Cassese argues that international law 
should endeavor to “build devices to withstand the seismic activity 
of states: to prevent or diminish their pernicious effect” in 
“demolish[ing] the very bricks and mortar from which the Law of 
Nations is built.”112  Furthermore, he cautions that “the [T]ribunal 
must always contend with the violent eruptions of state 
sovereignty: the effect of states’ lack of cooperation is like lava 
burning away the foundations of the institution.”113  In particular, 
Judge Cassese was referring to the ICTR and ICTY’s lack of 
enforcement powers and their need to rely entirely on the 
cooperation of states for executing their orders.114  However, this 
general warning principle explains just as well the tensions 
between the expansion of international criminal law, which, to be 
truly universal, must limit state sovereignty.  At its heart, 
international criminal law tests the very validity of international 
law by trumping or limiting state sovereignty.115 
At its inception, the ICTR was restricted by the Security 
Council in the sources that it could look to when deciding cases; it 
was allowed to apply customary international law and 
international treaties binding on Rwanda at the time of the 
genocide.116  This limit—largely analogous to, but less restrictive 
than what the Security Council also placed on the ICTY117—
 
110 See ANTONIO CASSESE, THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
SELECTED PAPERS 424–25 (2008) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing internation-
al human rights law owing to state sovereignty).  
111 Id. at 425 (quoting German legal scholar Theodor Niemeyer). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 425–26. 
115 Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 127, 128 (1996).  
116 Mia Swart, Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the 
Sources of International Law and “Adventurous Interpretation,” 70 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 459, 461 (2010).  
117 Id. 
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originated implicitly in the Security Council’s principle of 
restricted delegation of powers, limiting the role of judges and 
courts to avoid having them “legislate” the law, and instead 
merely interpreting and applying it, or iudicis est ius dicere sed non 
dare.118  Despite this general principle, judicial lawmaking in the 
international context is often inevitable.  When confronted with a 
situation where there is no clear pre-existing rule, judges routinely 
make new rules or modify existing law to formulate a new rule.119  
Moreover, judges are tasked with deciding actual cases, and when 
faced with inadequate or insufficient law, find themselves forced to 
develop the law in order to meet their mandate of reaching a 
decision.120  This process proved to be fundamentally true of the 
ICTR and its jurisprudence.  In the aforementioned Akayesu case, 
for example, the Tribunal based its decision almost entirely on a 
“conceptual approach” in the face of few (or no) legitimately 
recognized sources of international law upon which to reason 
through its decision.121  Arguably, part of the reason why the ICTR 
was willing and able to do this originated in the judges’ 
recognition that their time to curb the ‘volcano’ of state sovereignty 
and impunity to jus cogens was limited because the Tribunal was 
an impermanent structure.  The ICTR was perhaps also 
emboldened by the understanding that its decisions and law-
making, though otherwise a significant incursion upon the 
sovereignty of states, was unlikely to be seen by the most powerful 
state actors (i.e., the permanent members of the Security Council) 
as a direct transgression on their sovereignty.  These powerful state 
actors likely saw themselves as far removed—and as a practical 
matter immune—from the ICTR’s new jurisprudence because of 
the particular context within which it was being developed.122  The 
 
118 Id. See also Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Law-
making, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 640–41 (2005) (exploring three kinds of judicial law-
making: explicit delegation, implicit delegation, and non-consensual).  
119 See Ginsburg, note 118, at 641. 
120 Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
429, 469–70 (2004). 
121 Swart, supra note 116, at 476. 
122 Various scholars have argued that the (generous) funding of the Tribunals 
by the Security Council, relative to other international courts and tribunals, sug-
gest that powerful permanent states of the Security Council do not perceive these 
Tribunals as a threat to their interests.  See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 666–
67; Eric Posner & John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 68 (2005) (discussing the difference between the ICC, which is in-
dependent of the United Nations Security Council, and the ICTR, which was cre-
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salience of the context thus also animated the court to take the 
creative risks that it did.  On the other hand, the body of 
international criminal law called for the development of highly 
specific rules and principles, which the ICTR judges had an 
unprecedented opportunity to advance through the context of the 
cases they were deciding. 
The closure of the ICTR and other ad hoc courts such as the 
ICTY also gives rise to the structural challenges of managing 
ongoing legal and moral obligations to those whose interests 
continue long after the Tribunal’s close—the so-called ‘residual’ 
responsibilities and affirmative duties.123  At the outset, it was not 
immediately clear that a ‘residual’ mechanism would be the 
natural vehicle by which the Tribunals would transfer and wrap 
up their work. The two options before the Security Council may 
logically have been either to refer all cases—even ongoing ones—to 
their national jurisdictions of Rwanda or Yugoslavia, or to leave 
the Tribunals ‘standing’ with their structures intact and make 
appropriate adjustments to their budget and administration.124  
However, the Security Council instead selected the option of 
creating a historically innovative ‘residual’ structure.125  This 
decision is perhaps due in part to perceived Tribunal legacy 
contributions to the development of the international rule of law, 
as a result of which, the international community had become 
’accustomed‘ to the Tribunal’s continuing presence.  The Tribunal 
therefore could not “simply shut down from one day to the next,” 
and yet, this consideration had to be weighed against the need to 
 
ated by the Security Council).  Moreover, that the Tribunals have limited subject 
matter and temporal jurisdictions whose targets are individuals in failed or weak 
states, would suggest that the Tribunals’ decisions were not threatening to power-
ful state actors.  Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter 
or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 780 (2006) (“ICT 
[International Criminal Tribunal] prosecutions will be directed almost exclusively 
at individuals engaged in civil conflict within weak or failing states.”).   
123 See Reiger, supra note 19, at 1.  See Thomas Wayde Pittman, The Road to the 
Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: From 
Completion to Continuation, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 797, 805 (2011) (describing the lim-
ited expected lifespan of the Tribunal and arguing that the meaning of its legacy 
will include its residual function connotations). 
124 Guido Acquaviva, Was a Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tri-
bunals Really Necessary?, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 789, 793–95 (2011). 
125 Neither the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) nor the US 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT) had established a separate structure for its 
‘residual’ work.  Id. at 791–93. 
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economize on Tribunal costs.126  Therefore, the solution the 
Security Council created was a “small, temporary and efficient 
structure, whose functions and size will diminish over time, with a 
small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions.”127 
In December 2008, the Secretary General identified several core 
functions such a residual structure for the ICTR and ICTY would 
have to fulfill: trying fugitives and contempt cases, protecting 
witnesses, reviewing judgments, enforcing sentences, assisting and 
referring cases to national jurisdictions, and housing and 
maintaining archives.128  In light of the Mechanism’s essential 
functions, its name—‘residual’ Mechanism—is somewhat 
misleading.129  The articulation and adoption of a completion 
strategy by the ICTR was a necessary step in concluding its 
mandate.  However, the specific provisions incorporated into the 
Completion Strategy have subjected the Tribunal to criticism, 
leaving some scholars to argue that the process of justice has been 
superseded by the need for judicial economy.130 
The formulation of the residual Mechanism was officially 
established a decade into the Tribunal’s existence, in Security 
Council Resolution 1503 of 2003.  This Resolution incorporated the 
two strategies articulated by then-ICTR President Claude Jorda, 
focusing on the most senior level perpetrators while concurrently 
strengthening local judges and courts.131  A year later, in March 
2004, the Security Council, in adopting Resolution 1534, provided 
for a review of caseloads with “a view to determining which cases 
should be proceeded with and which should be transferred to 
 
126 Id. at 795. 
127 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5, ¶ 7. 
128 Id. at 3.  See Catherine Denis, Critical Overview of the ‘Residual Functions’ of 
the Mechanism and its Date of Commencement (including Transitional Arrangements), 9 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 819 (2011) (assessing in-depth the eight functions of the residual 
Mechanism, including trial of fugitives; trial of contempt cases; protection of wit-
nesses; review of judgments; referral of cases to national jurisdictions; enforce-
ment of sentences; assistance to national authorities and management of the Tri-
bunal’s archives). 
129 Ruth Frolich, Introductory Note to the UN Security Council Resolution 1966: 
International Residual Mechanism for the ICTY and ICTY, 50 I.L.M. 323, 323 (2011). 
130  Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 687, 689 (2006). 
131 Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad 
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143 (2005); S.C. Res. 
1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503, ¶ 7 (Aug. 28, 2003). 
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competent national jurisdictions.”132  This Security Council 
Resolution also stipulated a deadline for the Tribunal’s work, along 
with half-yearly mandatory reporting requirements “setting out 
the progress made towards implementation of the Completion 
Strategy of the Tribunal, explaining what measures have been 
taken and what measures remain to be taken.”133  This stringent 
focus on deadlines has led one concerned observer to critique that 
the ad hoc Tribunal Completion Strategies 
 reflect a lack of value for the host of implicit social and 
political functions not enumerated in the [promulgating] 
Statutes.  By setting these functions aside in favor of a 
strategic model that invites equating closure with docket 
clearing, the various authors of the Completion Strategies 
risk wagering the legacy of the Tribunals on the ability to 
meet deadlines.134 
The national referral strategy embodied in the Security Council 
Resolutions was realized in June 2011, when the ICTR transferred 
its first case, that of Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, to Rwanda after the 
panel of judges decided that the Government of Rwanda was 
“prepared to receive its first referral.”135  Eventually, the legitimacy 
 
132 S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 5, ¶ 4. 
133 Id. ¶ 6. 
134 Bingham, supra note 130. 
135 Uwinkindi’s transfer occurred despite amici briefs submitted by Human 
Rights Watch, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, and the In-
ternational Criminal Defence Attorneys Association who all raised concerns indi-
cating that witness intimidation by the Government of Rwanda was widespread 
and prevalent, and infringed on defendants’ rights to a fair trial.  Uwinkindi’s trial 
in Rwanda has not started as of the publication of this Comment.  His lead de-
fense counsel has raised concerns over the lack of governmental funding and legal 
aid to mount his defense, including expenses for the hiring of investigative per-
sonnel and identifying and presenting potential witnesses.  The ICTR has, in total, 
transferred eight cases to Rwanda, with the last on June 28, 2012.  In this last deci-
sion, the Referral Chamber “expresse[d] its solemn hope that the Republic of 
Rwanda, in accepting referrals from this Tribunal, will actualise in practice the 
commitments it has made about its good faith, capacity and willingness to enforce 
the highest standards of international justice in the referred cases.”  Munyaru-
garama, Case No. ICTR-02-79-R11bis, Referral Proceedings Pursuant To Rule 11 
Bis, ¶ 69 (June 28, 2012).  See Press Release, ICTR, Case of Jean Uwinkindi Referred 
for Trial to the Republic of Rwanda, ICTR/INFO-9-2-6811.EN (June 28, 2011), 
available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1216; Prosecutor 
v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Re-
quest for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011); Uwinkindi Trial Post-
poned on Constitutional Challenge, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 18, 2013), 
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of the process by which Uwinkindi’s trial, and that of others, is 
conducted by the government of Rwanda will, by extension, reflect 
on the Tribunal’s ability to secure the highest standard of 
international due process and fairness for all of those who have 
appeared before it, and thereby indirectly impact its legacy. 
Finally, Security Council Resolution 1966 in December 2010 
officially established the Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals (MICT) with two branches.136  The Arusha Branch of the 
Tribunal’s residual Mechanism officially began its work in July 
2012.137  The Mechanism is self-described as a “new small, 
temporary and efficient body, tasked with continuing the 
‘jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions’ of the 
ICTR and the ICTY; and maintaining the legacy of both 
institutions.”138  So far, the Arusha branch has been designated as 
fully functional and has begun issuing orders and decisions.139  The 
management of the remaining issues of the Tribunal’s functions by 
the innovative and untested structure of the Mechanism will 
impact its legacy as demonstrative of how it ended its work, and 
 
http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/409-rwanda-justice/34038-180113-
rwandajustice-uwinkindi-trial-postponed-on-constitutional-challenge;  Kigali De-
nies Lack of Funds for Uwinkindi Defence, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/current-cases/uwinkindi-jean-
bosco/33799-160912-rwandaictr-kigali-denies-lack-of-funds-for-uwinkindi-
defence; Press Release, ICTR, Munyarugarama Case Transferred to Rwanda, 
ICTR/INFO-9-2-724.EN (June 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1294;  Uwinkindi Transfer to 
be “Robustly Monitored,” says ICTR, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/342-current-cases/uwinkindi-
jean-bosco/33069-210412-ictrrwanda-uwinkindi-transfer-to-be-robustly-
monitored-says-ictr. 
136 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5, ¶ 6; Frolich, supra note 129. 
137 See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5; U.N. MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, http://www.unmict.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).  The 
Hague Branch of the Mechanism will take on the functions of the ICTY on July 1, 
2013. 
138 U.N. MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 137. 
139 Judge Theodor Meron, President of the Mechanism for Int’l Criminal Tri-
bunals & President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Re-
marks to the U.N. Sec. Council (Dec. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.unmict.org/files/statements/121205_president_meron_ny_sc_en.pd
f; Letter from the President of the Int’l Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribu-
nals to the President of the Sec. Council (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.unmict.org/ 
files/documents/progress_reports/121116_progress_report_en.pdf (describing 
the commencement of operations at Arusha branch including functions and plans 
for new permanent premises of the Arusha branch). 
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whether, in the last leg of the process, it did so in a manner that 
consolidates its contributions.  As one scholar notes, “[t]he legacy 
and judicial integrity of the time-limited international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals depend on these residual functions being 
addressed effectively.”140  This area of the Tribunal’s structural 
legacy will continue to unfold in the years ahead. 
5. MEMORIAL LEGACY: TOWARDS A RE-IMAGINED COLLECTIVE 
NARRATIVE 
Collective memory consists “of the stories a society tells about 
momentous events in its history, the events that most profoundly 
affect the lives of its members and most arouse their passions for 
long periods.”141  This category of events includes genocides as 
well as the legal proceedings arising from such an event.142  
Professor Martha Minow, in writing about remembering the past 
in order to prevent atrocities in the future, notes: 
It is here—in resisting narratives of collective guilt and 
producing a different sort of collective memory—that 
international criminal trials . . . can be of value.  The task is 
to help the society—and the watching world—not merely 
recall but also re-member, that is, to reconstitute a 
community of humanity against which there can be crimes 
(hence, “crimes against humanity”), and within which 
victims and survivors can be reclaimed as worthy 
members.143 
As another scholar also notes: 
As an aim for criminal law, the cultivation of collective 
memory resembles deterrence in that it is directed toward 
the future, where enhanced solidarity is sought.  But like 
retribution, it looks to the past, to provide the narrative 
content of what is to be shared in memory.144 
 
140 Valerie Oosterveld, International Law and the Closure of the International and 
Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 37, 37 (2010). 
141 Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 
U. PA. L. REV.  463, 475 (1995). 
142 Id. 
143 Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass Atroci-
ty, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 429, 430 (1999). 
144 Osiel, supra note 141, at 474. 
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Trials are necessarily an imperfect vehicle for creating 
narratives—they are adversarial and often elicit constructed and 
rehearsed narratives.145  Specific to the ICTR, they are also biased in 
their selection of witnesses and subjects in that only those most 
responsible for the genocide will appear before the court.146  
Anthropologist Nigel Eltringham argues, after viewing courtroom 
proceedings at the Tribunal and interviewing defense and 
prosecution counsels and judges at the ICTR, that witnesses and 
defendants are subjected to “coercive, enticed remembering,” a 
project where “the lawyer, judge, Truth Commissioner and 
historian are all artisans of memory, imposing ‘temporal causal 
sequencing [that] makes sense of action.’”147  His critique of the 
historical record generated by courts, and the Tribunal in 
particular, is of the law’s revision of the record through judicial 
review, thereby potentially “re-configur[ing]” how history is read 
in the future.148 He also critiques the sheer volume of material 
generated by the Tribunal and questions how it will be accessible 
to future “consumers.”149  
Minow acknowledges that the use of trials to help society 
remember may render tribunals vulnerable to the charge of 
deliberate myth-making to “the point of rendering the distinction 
between truth and falsity problematic,” but she credits Professor 
Mark Osiel with the defense that such lengths are nevertheless 
justified.150  According to Osiel, writing history and influencing 
collective memory is necessary.151  He argues that the “process of 
ideological construction need not be illegitimate, nor necessarily 
accomplished by sleight of hand.  In aspiring to infuse liberal 
memory, judges may justifiably construe the record of administrative 
massacre to tell a compelling story vindicating the preeminent liberal 
 
145 Bingham, supra note 130, at 700. 
146 See Minow, supra note 143, at 431 (“[T]rial forces those individuals selected 
for prosecution to serve as central, larger-than-life characters, who stand in for all 
the numerous others who could not be found, or who could not feasibly be tried if 
the nation is to go on to any future.”). 
147 Nigel Eltringham, “We are not a Truth Commission”: Fragmented Narratives 
and the Historical Record at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 11 J. 
GENOCIDE RES. 55, 60 (2009). 
148 Id. at 69. 
149 Id. at 73. 
150 Minow, supra note 143, at 46. 
151 See generally Osiel, supra note 141, at 463. 
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virtue:  respect for the moral rights of individuals.”152  Whether the 
historical record generated by the Tribunal is incomplete, or too 
voluminous, it is now a record for the annals of history.  Journalist 
Philip Gourevitch, in his interviews with Rwandans in the 
immediate days after the genocide, pointed out that he “felt that 
these stories were offered to [him] the way that shipwrecked 
people, neither drowned nor saved, send messages in bottles:  in 
the hope that, even if the legends they carry can do the teller no 
good, they may at some other time be of use to somebody, 
somewhere else.”153 
An important part of the Tribunal’s memorial legacy is its 
archives, which are sometimes said to be the physical 
manifestation of society’s collective memory, subject to responsible 
storage and collection for its future interpreters and narrators.154  
The Security Council and ICTR itself recognize the existence of 
such a legacy in the Tribunal’s archives.155  Indeed, the ICTR’s 
Mechanism spends much of its time strategizing over how to best 
preserve the records, where they should be located, and how and 
to whom access should be granted.156  The Tribunal’s record-
keeping is innovative and has broken new ground in techniques 
for management, despite its initial logistical hiccups.157 
The records of the ICTR hold the nearly 900,000 pages of 
transcripts and audio and video recordings of more than 6,000 trial 
days, more than 10,000 interlocutory decisions, and the judgments 
 
152 Id. at 647 (emphasis added). 
153 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 183. 
154 Kenneth E. Foote, To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture, 
53 AMER. ARCHIVIST 378, 378 (1990). 
155 Press Release, General Assembly, Budget Committee Takes Up Proposed 
2010-2011 Financing for International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, Former 
Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release GA/AB/3936 (Dec. 10, 2009) (noting that the 
physical archive will “facilitate ongoing and future prosecutions [and] serve as a 
historic record”). 
156 See, e.g., Tom A. Adami & Martha Hunt, Genocidal Archives: The African 
Context—Genocide in Rwanda, 26 J. SOC’Y OF ARCHIVISTS 105 (2005); Timothy Gal-
limore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its 
Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239 
(2008); Tom A. Adami, The Management of International Criminal Justice Records: The 
Case of Rwandan Tribunal, 13 AFR. J. LIBR. 1 (2003); Tom A. Adami, “Who will be left 
to tell the tale?” Recordkeeping and International Criminal Jurisprudence, 7 ARCHIVAL 
SCI. 213 (2007). 
157 Adami, “Who will be left to tell the tale?,”supra note 156. 
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of all the accused.158  This collection includes the records of the 
Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry, under 
which include the records of the ICTR detention facility in Arusha 
and the highly sensitive records of the Witnesses and Victims 
Support Section (WVSS), Gender Advisory Unit, and related ICTR 
Kigali medical unit.  All of these require special protection in their 
retention.159  However, despite Security Council Resolution 1966 
stipulating that the archives of the ICTR (and ICTY) remain the 
property of the United Nations and be “inviolable wherever 
located,” their final site of location has not yet been determined.160  
Security Council Resolution 1966 is to be reviewed in 2014, and in 
this interim period, the residual Mechanism is responsible for and 
has assumed the management of the archives.161  Alarmingly, 
Rwanda’s bid for custody of the ICTR archives has recently gained 
momentum with support of the East African Community (EAC).162  
In October 2012, the EAC Secretary General, Dr. Richard Sezibera, 
sent a letter to the United Nations supporting Rwanda’s hosting of 
the archives.163  “It would not be fair for the documents of the 
Genocide that happened in Rwanda to be hosted in Arusha,” EAC 
Minister Monique Mukaruliza noted in a December 2012 Press 
Conference in Nairobi.164 
The fight for control of the ICTR’s archives is, in some ways, a 
“battle to control the future.”165  As historians Joan M. Schwartz 
 
158 Address to the United Nations Sec. Council, supra note 10. 
159 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Temporary Courts, Permanent Records (Woodrow 
Wilson Ctr. for Scholars, Hist. & Pub. Pol’y Prog. Occasional Paper, 2008), available 
at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/TCPR_Peterson_HAPPOP0 
2.pdf. 
160 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5, Art. 27.1, ¶ 1. 
161 U.N. Security Council to Decide Fate of Rwanda Tribunal Archives’ Fate, says 
Official, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.hirondellenews. 
org/ictr-rwanda/404-ictr-institutional-news/33682-050912-unmict-un-security-
council-to-decide-final-destination-of-ictr-archives. 
162 Rodrigue Rwirahira, Push for Custody of ICTR Archives Gathers Momentum, 
THE EAST AFRICAN (Dec. 7, 2012, 7:56 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/ 
Rwanda/News/Push-for-custody-of-ICTR-archives-gathers-momentum/-
/1433218/1639028/-/oliptuz/-/index.html. 
163 Letter from the Secretary-General [East African Community] to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (Oct. 18, 2002), http://www.securitycouncilreport. 
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_779.pdf. 
164 Eric Kabeera, EAC Backs Rwanda to Host ICTR Archives, THE SUNDAY TIMES 
Dec. 2, 2012,  http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15194&a=13081. 
165 ICTR Archives: The Battle to Control the Future, YOUTUBE, http://www.  
youtube.com/watch?v=AZhWihjMPMs (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
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and Terry Cook have argued, “[t]hrough archives, the past is 
controlled.  Certain stories are privileged and others 
marginalized.”166  Schwartz and Cook equate archives with 
collective memory and the human identity.167  Archives as records 
exercise power over the “shape and direction of historical 
scholarship, collective memory, and national identity.”168  Archives 
become institutions when they wield power over the 
administrative, legal, and fiscal accountability of governments and 
engage in powerful public policy debates.169  Control of the ICTR 
archives equates to symbolic and physical control of the past and a 
roadmap for the future.  As early as March 2010, an Expert Group 
Meeting had recognized the vital importance of securing the 
Tribunal’s archives.  Its final report noted the “need to retain an 
accessible archive which will notably assist to prevent historical 
revisionism in the affected regions and therefore avoid fuelling 
future conflict.”170  In fact, this report devoted a specific section to 
the special considerations involving the ICTR archives, which are 
“essential to the long-term memory or memorialization of the 
conflict.”171 
Since the late 1990’s, Rwanda has embarked on a national 
reconciliation program that protects the singular narrative of 
Rwandan genocide history as disseminated by its victorious RPF-
dominated government.172  This skewed narrative discounts the 
participation of the RPF in atrocities committed during the 
genocide and their violations of international humanitarian law.  It 
purports to erase differences in ethnic identities as an essential 
element of institutionalizing the hegemonic power aspirations of a 
 
166 Joan M. Schwartz & Terry Cook, Archives, Records, and Power: The Making 
of Modern Memory, 2 ARCHIVAL SCI. 1, 1–2 (2002). 
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 2. 
169 Id. at 1–2. 
170 FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON “CLOSING THE 
INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS 
RESIDUAL ISSUES” 1, 2 (2010). 
171 Id. at 5.  
172 JENNIFER MELVIN, BEYOND THE VENEER OF RECONCILIATION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA (2012).  See also RWANDA NATIONAL UNITY AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.nurc.gov.rw (last visited Apr. 5, 2013); 
Chi Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201 (2005). 
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minority Tutsi elite.173  It is perpetuated through the indoctrination 
of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans in mandatory live-in 
solidarity educations camps (ingandos), civic education camps, and 
preserved by gacaca courts.174  The Rwandan national reconciliation 
program is only part of the dictatorship government’s overall 
strategy of deliberate and skillful manipulation of its historical 
narrative to suit current regime interests.175  The ICTR’s archives, 
as the (albeit imperfect) records for the continuing construction of 
universal collective memory narratives of accountability and 
responsibility, should not be held hostage to a regime that has 
tried—and thus far with success—to extinguish inconvenient 
truths of the crimes it committed against humanity under the 
shadow of the genocide. 
 
6. SYMBOLIC LEGACY 
 
While defining ‘symbolism’ is not an easy task, Professor Barry 
O’Neill identifies three categories of symbols prevalent in 
international relations, of which two are relevant here:  ‘message’ 
symbols and ‘value’ symbols.176  Message symbols are 
communicative acts by which the sender intends for the receiver to 
follow a sequence of logic to arrive at a belief or action.177  Value 
symbols are defined by the strong attitudes generated by the ideas 
they represent, and “unite [] various ideas under one cognitive 
entity.”178  It is one where “the symbol itself comes to be valued by 
the group.”179  The categories of symbolism are not exclusive, and 
sometimes the same event will involve several symbols, for 
example, where the “emotional power of value symbols promotes 
their use as message symbols . . . .”180  This Part argues that the 
 
173 MELVIN, supra note 172, at 3–4; Filip Reyntjens, Constructing the Truth, 
Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 
110 AFR. AFF. 1, 30–31 (2011). 
174 Id. 
175 Reyntjens, supra note 173, at 26–34. 
176 BARRY O’NEILL, HONOR, SYMBOLS, AND WAR 3–8 (1999). 
177 Id. at 6–7. 
178 Id. at 7. O’Neill uses the example of a national flag which “represents its 
country in the geographical sense, as well as its history, culture, and institutions.” 
Id. 
179 Id. (emphasis added). 
180 Id. 
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ICTR has evolved from focusing on message symbolism to 
emphasizing value symbolism. 
Message symbolism of the law is in many ways similar to the 
‘expressive function’ of the law.  Professor Cass Sunstein defines 
this ‘expressive function’ as “making statements” that may be 
designed to change social norms, rather than controlling behavior 
directly.181  Specifically, he notes that the expressive function of the 
law can be understood in two different ways:  first, as a 
“statement” about the propriety or impropriety of certain acts or 
behavior, employed to shape social norms that ultimately influence 
judgment and behavior; and second, as a function of interest and 
commitment to integrity.182  The latter refers to the social meaning 
of conduct and embodies the idea that “[t]he expressive dimension 
of action can [itself] be an important reason for action.”183  Criminal 
law, he notes, “is a prime arena for the expressive function of 
law.”184 
Here, arguably, the ‘legal’ establishment of the Tribunal by the 
Security Council was an expressive function of international law 
meant to communicate a message and serve as a symbol.185  During 
Security Council deliberations leading to the establishment of the 
ICTR, various Members had voiced reasons for the creation of an 
international tribunal, including that “the establishment of the 
Tribunal is a clear message that the international community is not 
prepared to leave unpunished the grave crimes committed in 
Rwanda.”186  The messaging function communicated by the 
establishment of the Tribunal under the legally binding force of 
Chapter VII was unequivocal:  perpetrators of the genocide will be 
brought to justice under the mantle of a universal moral authority, 
wherever in the world they may be shrouded. 
 
181 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2024–25 (1996). 
182 Id. at 2025–27. 
183 Id. at 2027. 
184 Id. at 2044. 
185 For a discussion of whether the Security Council makes international law, 
see Tono Eitel, The UN Security Council and its Future Contribution in the Field of In-
ternational Law, 4 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 53, 60–61 (2000) (arguing that the Security 
Council makes “Council Law” through the part of their Resolutions that claim 
binding force, and that “Council Law” should be in the same class as “Treaty 
Law” and “Court Law”). 
186 U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28 (providing a statement of the Argen-
tinian delegate) (emphasis added). 
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[O]ne aim of the Tribunals at the time of creation involved 
not the reality but the image of a tribunal—the semaphoric 
weight of the institution in the abstract. . . . [T]he Tribunals 
themselves, at the time of creation, validated international 
rules proscribing genocide with a seat of judicial process.  
In this way, because the rules preceded the Tribunals, 
creating fora for judicial reckoning had the important effect 
of stamping international rules with authority.187 
The unanimity needed to symbolically communicate the 
international and universal character of the condemnation may be 
one reason that delegates during the Security Council deliberations 
were so concerned about Rwanda’s refusal to ratify the 
Resolution,188 and might also help to explain why every member of 
the Security Council went on to ratify the Resolution, except for 
China, which abstained.189  As the representative from the United 
Kingdom stated, “My Government regrets that Rwanda felt 
compelled to vote against the draft resolution . . . [b]ut it was 
essential to maintain in the statute and in the resolution the 
international character of the Tribunal . . . .”190  Symbolic too was 
the deliberate location of the Tribunal on the African continent and 
in Arusha, Tanzania—where the Peace Accords of 1993 were 
signed between the RPF and the then-government of Rwanda—as 
the hope for peace and international commitment to justice in that 
small and remote corner of East Africa.191 
Over time, the Tribunal’s symbolism has taken on a larger life. 
Given the body of substantive criminal and humanitarian law the 
Tribunal has generated, the Tribunal’s performance and rendition 
of justice, the interpretive narratives it generated, and ultimately its 
very presence as an active international criminal court prosecuting 
 
187 Bingham, supra note 130, at 690–91. 
188 Mr. Keating, delegate from New Zealand, noted that “[o]rdinary people 
the world over will not understand if the Government of Rwanda turns its back 
on the efforts of the United Nations to ensure that the trial and punishment of the 
perpetrators of genocide take place.” U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 301. 
189 Id. at 305 (statement of Chinese delegate discussing China’s reasons for 
abstaining from voting). 
190 Id. at 301–02 (statement of the delegate from the United Kingdom). 
191 THIERRY CRUVELLIER, COURT OF REMORSE: INSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 7 (Chari Voss trans., 2010) (2006) (“The link be-
tween Nuremberg and Arusha cannot be easily denied, except perhaps in the 
symbolism. . . . Arusha was a symbol of peace, and the UN tribunal was an at-
tempt to restore it in the eyes of its creators.”) 
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those most responsible for the 1994 atrocities in Rwanda, the 
Tribunal is far more than the sum of its parts.192  The ideas and 
ideals the Tribunal represents have generated strong attitudes and 
emotions, and it may now be valued as symbols of much more: 
It is this symbolic function of the Tribunals, so apparent in 
the rhetoric of their creation, that is most threatened by the 
prospect of their permanent closure.  In other words, not 
only will the Tribunals no longer be “out there,” they also 
face the difficult task of closing without unraveling or 
distorting their role as a “symbolic validation” of the 
international community’s commitment to bringing war 
criminals to justice.193 
Perhaps the ICTR will best be remembered as, and best symbolizes, 
the moral response of this generation tested after having once 
vowed “never again.”194 
7. CONCLUSION 
For nearly two decades, the ICTR has held a grip on the public 
imagination as the physical manifestation of the international 
search for justice and accountability after one of history’s worst 
atrocities.  Its work in a remote corner of East Africa in the shadow 
of Mount Meru has not gone unnoticed:  to Rwandans, this search 
for justice may have been fraught with tension as the ICTR seemed 
to fail in garnering justice for those victims of RPF atrocities in a 
society that has become more divided and politicized since the 
genocide.  To the international community, this search for justice 
came at a high price, after long trials of patience over the obstacles 
 
192 See, e.g., Derrick Alan Everett, Public Narratives + Reparations in Rwanda: 
On the Potential of Film as Promoter of International Human Rights + Reconciliation, 7 
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 103, 127 (2009) (arguing that in the movie Sometimes in April 
“[s]uch an image of the actual ICTR courts can be profoundly positive for those 
who have lost faith in justice, because it shows a functioning international legal 
justice system in which accused genocidaires [sic] suffer from the ramifications of 
their actions”). 
193 Bingham, supra note 130, at 691 (internal citation omitted). 
194 See David Rieff, The Persistence of Genocide, 165 POL’Y REV. 29, 29 (2011), 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/64261 
(noting that the phase “Never Again” has become a “kind of shorthand for the 
remembrance of the Shoah [Holocaust],” and because of the continued persistence 
of genocide, currently also for “any great crime against humanity that could not 
be prevented”). 
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created both by Rwanda and by the Tribunal’s own shortcomings 
in anticipating the organizational needs of a vast international 
justice organ with little prior precedent to emulate. 
It is possible, as some commentators have argued, that the 
Tribunal was set up to salvage the international community’s guilt 
at standing by while one of history’s worst atrocities unfolded, that 
is, as a self-serving moral salvo.195  It is a fact that through most of 
its lifespan, the enormous cost—often crudely calculated as the cost 
spent by the international community per conviction—has 
accumulated to more than an estimated $1.4 billion to the 
international community,196 and that it overran its substantial 
budget multiple times.197  It is also the case that the Tribunal has 
struggled with very public staffing and management issues for the 
first several years of its existence.198  In short, justice at the Tribunal 
may have been expensive and time-consuming.199  International 
tribunals like the ICTR “are not cheap and the beginning models 
may not be the best,” but they hold the promise that international 
humanitarian norms may be strengthened and rendered 
enforceable.200  Despite these realities and shortcomings, this 
Comment has argued that the Tribunal’s impact has been 
profound. 
The Tribunal’s legacy to international criminal and 
humanitarian law, both central to the protection of contemporary 
international human rights, is undeniable, and may not even be 
fully appreciated as central to our current understanding.  Less 
 
195 U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 308. 
196 International Justice: In the Dock, but for What?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2010, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/17572645?story_id=17572645. See 
also, David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 861 (2006) 
(comparing the costs of criminal prosecutions at the ICTY and the ICTR to those 
in the United States).  Wippman notes that “[t]he perception that international 
criminal trials are costly and slow is accurate but misleading.  On average, ICTY 
trials do cost much more than an average criminal trial in the United States.  But 
the reasons relate principally to the inherent complexity of the cases being tried, 
the dependence of the Tribunal on international cooperation, and the costs implic-
it in its international nature (including translation and travel).”  Id. at 880. 
197 See Wippman, supra note 196 (describing the costs of ICTR trials).  
198 See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PROGRESS 
AND NEW CHALLENGES 99–100 (2005) (describing the ICTR’s initial staffing and lo-
gistical problems). 
199  Patricia M. Wald, Punishment of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 69 
SOC. RES. 1119, 1122–23 (2002). 
200 Id. at 1134. 
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recognized are the Tribunal’s multiple other legacies in the 
precedential value of its structure, in its poignant memorial 
function, and in its indeterminable symbolic value.  The Tribunal’s 
structural legacy is one in the making, as its residual Mechanism 
comes to fulfill the Tribunal’s concluding processes in the years 
ahead.  The Tribunal’s memorial function has since shaped a 
collective narrative of the genocide that acknowledges guilt, but 
moves beyond it to vindicate the triumph of a universal search for 
justice, whose legacy continues to evolve as the Tribunal’s 
voluminous record is preserved for future historians.  Finally, the 
Tribunal’s symbolic legacy may be one of its most enduring 
features:  it has come, over the course of its life, to epitomize justice 
and the fight against the impunity of those who would commit the 
most egregious crimes against humanity; and it has garnered the 
hope that its end may have been replaced with something more 
enduring in the continuing struggle to protect human rights 
around the world.  
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